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[When one thinks of international law and human rights, one imagines that 
they are complimentary phenomena.  The goal of international law is to 
protect human rights, and human rights are to be enjoyed, presumably on 
a global basis, under the protection of a universally binding rule of inter-
national law. To be for human rights is necessarily to be for international 
law, and vice versa.  The central purpose of this essay is to argue that not 
only is the presumed positive relationship between international law and 
human rights not necessarily the case, but that the relationship is of a 
more tense and conflictual nature. In some cases, there is a negative or in-
verse relationship between law and human rights.  While there is an as-
sumption that the promotion of international law and the promotion of 
human rights are essentially part of the same project of modernity, this is 
not the case.  At a rhetorical level, they appear to be one and the same 
thing, but at a practical level – literally, at the level at which international 
law is practiced and at which human rights is practiced – international 
law and human rights constitute different value-spheres in the contempo-
rary world.] 
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I INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Since the Enlightenment, there have been various modern, liberal, progressive 
projects aimed at human advancement.  One might refer to these as different trajec-
tories of action. One trajectory of action has been the rise of international law, an 
attempt to render into global form that which has always been present in societies as 
a source of order, stability, and social control for relations among states. Interna-
tional law is a relatively modern phenomenon, which emerged in the 19th century 
and which was primarily concerned with regulating the conduct of war, and subse-
quently the more general conduct of nations, not only among themselves, but of 
conduct by sovereigns toward their own subjects.  Another trajectory of action has 
been what I call the “cultural project of human rights.”  This cultural project has 
consisted of 1. deriving a set of sacred ideals of human existence and the human 
individual and  2. the attempt to translate these ideals into practice on a global level.  
It is tempting to think of these trajectories as being virtually indistinguishable, as 
one in the same.  I want to argue that they are not, that they are different trajecto-
ries, which only now and then converge, but which are principally divergent and 
distantiated.  This divergence and distantiation has always been evident historically, 
but has become particularly evident in the period of late modernity. In addition, this 
divergence is not a result of mutual effect.  Rather, it is the case that international 
law, in critical cultural moments, has come to work against the liberal cultural 
project of human rights in modernity.1   International law, as a formal system of 
law, and the cultural project of human rights, as a cultural system2 are two different 
modern projects, based on differing cultural logics, which lead to different ways of 
apprehending the world, different patterns of attention and cognition to world-
phenomena, different forms of social action, and differing outcomes for suffering 
individuals and collectivities in the modern world.  It is this conflict and diver-
gence, which has become particularly pronounced in late modernity, that I want to 
address in this essay, using a case study from recent history - the Iraq war and the 
conflict about the war - to illustrate it.  
 
1 The longer project upon which this essay is based is an effort to bring the insights of sociological 
theory and cultural sociology more closely to bear on the subject of human rights, international law, and 
contemporary political conflicts, especially the war in Iraq: see THOMAS CUSHMAN, A MATTER OF 
PRINCIPLE: HUMANITARIAN ARGUMENTS FOR THE WAR IN IRAQ (2005); See also Thomas Cushman, 
The Human Rights Case for the War in Iraq: A Consequentialist View, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF 
TERROR (Richard Ashby Wilson ed., 2005).  On each of these subjects, sociology has done, in my 
opinion, dismally. While human rights has become something of a global civil religion, there is virtually 
no sociology of human rights, with a few notable exceptions: see Bryan S. Turner, Outline of a Theory of 
Human Rights, in 27:3 SOCIOLOGY 489 (1993).  See also ANTHONY WOODWISS, HUMAN RIGHTS (2005). 
This is in contrast to the fact that the early classical theorists, especially Durkheim and Marx, were 
intimately involved in discussions of and criticisms of “the rights of man.” In addition, while the sociol-
ogy of law is a highly developed field, there is virtually no sociology of international law to speak of, 
and this at a time when an entire new class of legal experts in this area and social institutions of global 
civil society have emerged as the guardians of a new world global order.  And, regarding contemporary 
conflicts, the best that American sociology could do in regard to the war in Iraq was for its main profes-
sional association to pass a resolution condemning it, an act which virtually guaranteed that it could not 
become a serious object of study or theorizing. 
2 Clifford Geertz, Religion as a Cultural System, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES, SELECTED 
ESSAYS (1975).  
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The argument presented here is grounded primarily in Max Weber’s approach to the 
sociology of law, in particular, his concepts of formal rationality and substantive 
rationality.  As Trubek points out, “Weber was one of the first scholars to identify a 
distinctly sociological form of knowledge about the law and to distinguish it from 
the knowledge of the jurist (or legal scholar) as well as from that of the practicing 
lawyer.”3  While a sociology of law along these lines is a clear and distinct field, 
there exists virtually no systematic sociology of international law, Weberian or 
otherwise.4  This is extremely problematic for precisely the reason I argue in this 
paper: that development of international law is one of the central rationalization 
processes of modernity (understudied as such by sociologists) and in the current 
global context is a major form of power, which exerts a strong independent influ-
ence on contemporary global politics and social outcomes.  
 
For centuries, the conduct of nations had been regulated by the Roman tradition of 
law, which emphasized statutes and codes which were considered universal across 
time and space, without regard to local customs or traditions.  In addition, in the 
pre-modern world, relations between nations were governed by treaties or custom-
ary understandings between nations.  In principle, nations could make treaties or 
follow customs with any normative restraint whatsoever: whatever they decided to 
do was between them and the substance of the treaty or the custom was not held to 
any external normative or legal standard. 
 
It was only relatively recently that international law emerged in Europe as a new 
field which sought to define and institutionalize international law as a formal body 
of law which would regulate the conduct of nations according to specific ethical 
principles and civilizational values. As Koskenniemi points out,  modern interna-
tional law was essentially a creation of a new class of European legal scholars who 
wished to  establish  international law as a real and binding force for global govern-
ance, rather than a loose set of theoretical ideas and concepts about how nations 
should behave.5 Prior to that time, theories of international law were primarily 
3 David Trubek, Max Weber’s Tragic Modernism and the Study of Law in Society, 20 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 573 (1986). 
4 Weber’s sociology of law was, of course, a central aspect of his oeuvre.  There is a vigorous body of 
scholarship which applies Weber’s concepts and theories to different kinds of law in different places: 
see, e.g., Lonn Lanza-Kaduce, Formality, Neutrality, and Goal Rationality: The Legacy of Weber in 
Analyzing Legal Thought, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 533 (1982); Hubert Treiber, Elective Affini-
ties’ between Weber’s Sociology of Religion and Sociology of Law, 14 THEORY & SOC. 809 (1985); 
Martin Albrow, The Application of the Weberian Concept of Rationalization to Contemporary Condi-
tions, in MAX WEBER, RATIONALITY AND MODERNITY 164 (Scott Lash & Sam Whimster, eds., 1987); 
Sally Ewing, Formal Justice and the Spirit of Capitalism: Max Weber’s Sociology of Law, 21 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 487 (1987); Stephen M. Feldman, An Interpretation of Max Weber’s Theory of International 
Law: Metaphysics, Economics, and the Iron Cage of Constitutional Law, 16:2 LAW S.I.  205 (1991); 
David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 3 WIS. L. REV. 720 (1972); David 
Trubek, Reconstructing Max Weber’s Sociology of Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 919 (1985); David Trubeck, 
supra note 1; Ronen Shamir, Formal and Substantitive Rationality in American Law: A Weberian 
Perspective, 2 SOCIAL L. S. 45 (1993). Yet, an autonomous sociology of law, in Weber’s sense of a field 
of inquiry outside of the realm of international jurists proper is virtually non-existent: but see, e.g., 
Moshe Hirsch, The Sociology of International Law, UNIVERSITY T. L. J. (2005).   
5 MARTII KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, 1870-1960 (2001). 
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philosophical treatises, as for example that of Hugo Grotius, whose De jure belli ac 
pacis6 is considered to be the foundational philosophical document of international 
law.  Interestingly, the project of international law, especially in France, was very 
similar to the social science projects of the 19th century which attempted to derive 
scientific understandings of the world and uses these as the basis for practical forms 
of action aimed at ameliorating undesirable social conditions and creating a better 
world.7
 
The extreme international violence of the first half of the 20th century was testament 
to the fact that international law existed purely as an abstraction, a fictional set of 
cultural creations to which powerful states owed no allegiance.  Unlike other forms 
of law, international law had no binding power to back it up, no credible threat of 
force to compel obedience.  Thus, for instance, even though it was normally held to 
be wrong and illegal for nations to conquer other nations purely for territorial ag-
grandizement, the Soviet Union and Germany could, in 1939, make a treaty to 
divide and conquer Poland with virtual impunity.  The entire history of World War 
II was, in a sense, a history of lawlessness.  Following the Holocaust, plans for a 
new world order emerged in the form of the United Nations, which promised a 
unification of the rule of international law and human rights as the basis for a new 
global order.  At the very basis of this new world order was the United Nations 
Charter, a code of formal laws and statutes that all member states consented, at least 
in principle, to be bound by.   
 
What is most important to stress here is that international law was guided by the 
logic of what Weber called formal rationality.  While seemingly driven by ethical 
considerations, the body of international law which emerged after WWII was an 
autonomous system (autonomous in the sense of being separate and distinct from 
nation-states, even while being comprised of them), characterized precisely by its 
focus on the development of formal procedures, codes, conventions, and statutes 
which would be binding on nations across time and space, with no concern for 
particular or local values or differentials in power.  From the beginning, it was clear 
that these new rules for the world were formal constructions rather than concrete 
norms.  At the time of the signing of the UN Charter, the major principals, the 
United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the United States, and France were engaged in 
acts such as empire building which were, according the very letter of the law, 
illegal.  What was important, though, is that these rules became codified as the 
theoretical basis for how nations should behave, for what they should or should not 
do and remain, more or less, intact to the present day.  Most importantly, the arbiter 
of what would be legal or illegal was the UN Security Council, and the five nations 
which comprised its permanent membership.    
 
6 HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (2004 [1631]). 
7 See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 5. Kosenniemi shows that this was particularly the case in France where 
international law emerged as an intellectual field which was directly derived from Durkheim’s sociol-
ogy: the object of international law was to discover the social facts about the forms of sociality among 
nations and to derive international law from these facts. 
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As Koskenniemi shows, as a result of the Cold War, by the 1960s, the project of 
establishing a binding rule of international law to which all nations would consent, 
was essentially finished, replaced by considerations of realpolitik, an emphasis on 
order and stability (rather than morality), and the dominance of the United States 
and the Soviet Union.8  In spite of international law, for instance, the Soviet Union 
mounted interventions against Hungary and Czechoslovakia with virtual impunity 
and was only blocked from the more general occupation of Europe by the treat of 
US force.  China was able to occupy and colonize Tibet, an act which was strictly 
illegal, but not preventable, since international law, which proscribed such action, 
had no credible force to enforce the proscription.  This has been precisely the cen-
tral issue for international law: how to restrain the behavior of powerful nations by 
consent rather than by force, since there is no force which lies behind international 
law (which raises the question of whether international law is really law or not).  
The crisis of international law, that which, in a sense, makes it the “victim” is that it 
is powerless against real power.  What I would like to argue is that international law 
has continued to be ineffectual as a force for the prevention of gross violations of 
human rights.  With all due respect to what international law has suffered at the 
hands of sovereigns who refuse to consent to its rule, I would also like to explore 
how international law, as an autonomous system, rather than one completely tied to 
the caprice of powerful sovereigns, has performed in relation to human rights.9
 
The modern cultural project of human rights emanates from the Enlightenment and 
found concrete expression in the American Declaration of Independence and the 
French Declaration of the Rights of Man.  These projects were primarily concerned 
with the specification and sacralization of individual rights over and against state 
power or the power of individual sovereigns.  The early twentieth century brought 
with it new ideas about social and economic rights, which found expression in the 
Russian Revolution and later communist revolutions in the 20th century.  The real 
“moment” of the cultural project of human rights, however, was the  Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1946, which specified 50 rights that all individuals 
were entitled to simply by virtue of being human.  The UN Declaration of Human 
Rights, unlike the UN Charter, was an ideational document, a set of substantive 
values and ideals rather than a set of laws, rules, and procedures.  This is an impor-
tant point to stress, because it illustrates that from the beginning of the modern 
project of global governance, there was a tension between the form of international 
law and the substance of human rights.  There was no necessary connection be-
tween them and, in some cases, they were in direct conflict.  
 
For example, the UN Declaration of Human Rights guarantees the right of freedom 
from torture as one of its most important ideals.  Yet the UN Charter specifies 
directly that no country can interfere in the affairs of another state unless it is an act 
of self-defense.  Thus, in a hypothetical situation in which State X is violating the 
rights of its subjects by systematically torturing them and State Y desires to inter-
8  See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 5. 
9 It is crucial to see international law as a kind of performance, a perspective which I will raise in the 
latter sections of this essay.   
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vene to stop this and promote the human right to be free of torture, it would be 
illegal under international law for State Y to do so unless it had the consent of the 
UN Security Council.  Yet, the Security Council is guided by a different logic, 
buttressed not only by the letter of the law, but by the interests of the parties which 
hold veto power over any declaration of legality or illegality.  The Security Council, 
in this case, is guided by the spirit of formal rationality and pragmatic rationality, 
by the existence of formal law and the interests of its members.  While an interven-
tion may be morally legitimate according to human rights norms, it is, without the 
imprimatur of the Security Council, illegal.  Thus, from the beginning, this new 
system of global governance was characterized by fundamental cultural contradic-
tions, contradictions which have played themselves historically out in a variety of 
ways in modern history.  
 
Since the foundation of the United Nations, a massive system of NGOs and activists 
has emerged which engage in forms of social action which challenge traditional 
forms of power and domination and aim to assist those who are being abused or in 
need, those who lie outside the pale and protection of the value-sphere of the cul-
ture of human rights.10  The cultural project of human rights, at least in its abstract 
formulation, is a perfect example of a modern project which is based on a system of 
ethical values and principles, an expression of what Weber referred to as substan-
tive rationality.  It is fundamentally an ethical project, a “civilizing process” aimed 
at the alleviation of human suffering and evil based on a common set of secular (but 
religiously derived and perhaps even religious themselves)11 values and ethical 
principles which are the bases for various forms of social action.  More specifically 
in Weber’s terms, the cultural project of human rights is a form of what Weber calls 
ethical substantive rationality12 based on a common system of ethics and values 
which are normative templates for individual and collective action in the world.   
 
For Weber, an ethical standard, is “a specific type of value-rational belief among 
individuals which, as a consequence of this belief, imposes a normative element 
upon human action that claims the quality of the ‘morally good’ in the same way 
that action which claims the status of the ‘beautiful’ is measured against aesthetic 
standards.”13  The resultant forms of social action, are, in Weber’s terms, “practical-
ethical”, and range from small scale projects of individuals or groups who act in the 
name of these principles to help others to large scale humanitarian interventions by 
states which aim to rescue or liberate peoples from violence and/or state domination 
based on some perceived set of values about what is good and evil, right and wrong, 
just and unjust.  In any case, the basis for action is an “ethic of conviction (Gesin-
nungsethik).”  Sociologically speaking, the culture of human rights has become 
10 MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998). 
11 MICHAEL PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES (2000).  
12 Max Weber in Stephen Kalberg, Max Weber’s Types of Rationality: Corner stones for the Analysis of 
Rationalization Processes in History, 85 AMERICAN J. S. 1165, 1145 (1980). 
13 Id. 
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something like a quasi-religion or a global civil religion, as measured strictly along 
Durkheimian lines.14
 
At this point, those who know little of international law or human rights, but who 
know Weberian social theory, will immediately recognize the problem: for Weber, 
formal rationality and substantive rationality are fundamentally antagonistic to one 
another.15  This is a theme which resonates throughout Weber’s work, not only in 
regard to pointing out the tensions between formal rationality and substantive 
rationality more generally, but with specific reference to the markets and ethics, as 
well as law and justice.   In Economy and Society, in two passages from his brief 
fragment on the market, Weber notes this tension between the formal rationality of 
capitalism and the sphere of values.  In one passage, he notes: “Where the market is 
allowed to follow its own autonomous tendencies, its participants do not look 
toward the persons of each other, but only toward the commodity; there are no 
obligations of brotherliness or reverence, and none of those spontaneous human 
relations that are sustained by personal unions.”16  In another passage, Weber notes: 
“The ‘free market’, that is, the market not bound by ethical norms with its exploita-
tion of constellations of interests and monopoly positions and its dickering, is an 
abomination (Abscheu) to every system of fraternal ethics.  In sharp contrast to all 
other groups which always presuppose some measure of personal fraternization or 
even blood kinship, the market is fundamentally alien to any kind of fraternal 
relationship”17 (italics added).   This is about as clear a dichotomy as one could 
draw between formal rationality and substantive rationality: in fact, the strength of 
formal rationality is not simply seen as being at odds with or in conflict with frater-
nity, brotherhood, and kinship (which, it should be stressed are central to the ethos 
of the cultural project of human rights) but as alien to it, an abomination!18
 
This paper transposes Weber’s insights on the relationship between the market and 
ethics to the analysis of the relationship sphere of international law and the culture 
of human rights.  In some senses, the transposition is direct and mechanical, al-
though I will want to tease out some important modifications when discussing the 
specific ways in which international law and the culture of human rights are in 
14  EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE ([1915]1965); As Durkheim notes, 
religion is: “A unified set of beliefs and practices… which unite [into] one single moral community, all 
those who adhere to them.”  In this schema, it is human dignity that becomes sacred, while violence, of 
whatever provenance, against the individual human being is considered profane, to varying degrees.  For 
purposes of this paper, I am content to see the human rights project as a secular project, but nonetheless 
one which is imbued with a variety of constructions of the sacred and profane.  Stephen Kalberg’s 
analysis of this has been extremely valuable for me in considering human rights culture in Weberian 
terms as a secularized form of the sacred.  See, e.g., Kalberg, supra note 12. 
15 See Feldman, supra note 4; See also, Kalberg, supra note 12. 
16 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 636 (1978). 
17 Id. at 637. 
18 I am unaware of any commentary on Weber’s choice of the German word “Abscheu” to describe the 
relation of the market to ethics.  It is a very particular word in German, which conveys a sense of 
complete and utter disgust - in its adjectival form “Abscheulikeit”, it might be best translated as “odious-
ness”.  This particular word choice is crucial in pointing out the qualitative essence of the relation 
between formal and substantive rationality and belies Weber’s value judgment of the relations which he 
purports only to study scientifically. 
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conflict.  But if one substitutes “international law” for “free market”, and “proce-
dure” for “commodity” in Weber’s passages quoted above, one will have a pretty 
good idea of what I want to argue here, to wit:  “Where international law is allowed 
to follow its own autonomous tendencies, its participants do not look toward the 
persons of each other, but only toward the procedure; there are no obligations of 
brotherliness or reverence, and none of those spontaneous human relations that are 
sustained by personal unions.”  In a Weberian sense, international law has not only 
ceased to be a primary instrument of the culture of human rights, but has become a 
system – perhaps even a regime – of impersonal statutes, procedures, and processes 
which, in their action consequences, stand against universal ethical principles (or 
for that matter even particular ones).  This is a system which has evolved in the 20th 
century and which exists in-and-of-itself and in-and-for-itself, and which serves as 
an instrument through which various actors in the world-system can pursue their 
self-interests without regard to substantive ethical values.19  There is one very 
important clarification that I want to make here: I do not want to argue that there is 
no connection between formal international law and substantive principles of hu-
man rights.   Nor do I want to argue that the formal rationality of international law 
is not connected to any form of substantive rationality.  Nor, do I want to say that 
international law is an abomination to human rights in all cases.  In fact, in terms of 
the development of responses to gross violation of human rights, international law 
has done quite well in setting up a new judicial apparatus in the form of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, which is an institutionalized form of justice aimed at the 
punishment of violators of international law and human rights.  In this respect, it is 
a significant example of convergence between the rationality of international law 
and  ethical considerations of the culture of human rights, in this case the ideal of 
bringing to justice and making accountable for their action those who commit 
crimes against humanity and war crimes accountable for their action.   My focus is 
on the issue of prevention, on those cases in which the formal rationality of interna-
tional law is often egregiously at odds with the value rationality of human rights 
which specifies that gross violations of human rights ought to be prevented and not 
merely punished. 
 
This antagonistic dualism between the formal and the substantive is evident in 
Weber’s thinking about the law as well, even though Weber never really addressed 
international law in any systematic way.20  As Feldman notes, Weber’s approach to 
 
19 MICHAEL BARNETT, EYEWITNESS TO GENOCIDE (2002); Michael Barnett (1999) is one of the few 
international relations theorists to understand law in this sense: his work on the indifference of the UN 
toward the genocide in Rwanda indicates that the bureaucratic procedures of the UN and international 
law comprised an autonomous system which made it possible for the organization and international law 
to completely ignore and fail to prevent the mass murder of 800,000 people in one month in 1994. 
20 It is an interesting question as to why Weber never examined international law.  Well before his own 
time and during his time, in Germany, as Koskenniemi notes, there was a vigorous debate about the 
nature of international law in Germany and Weber must surely have been aware of them; see, e.g., 
KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 5.  My sense is that Weber sought to understand the more pure forms of law 
which were really law, according to his own sociological definition of law, which holds that law is only 
law to the extent that it is backed up by some credible threat of the use of force in case of violations.  
Indeed, in the history of international law, one of the key debates is not about what law should be, but 
whether international law really is actually law or not; See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 
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legal history is characterized by a dualism, or a dichotomy between formal law and 
the normative traditions of various groups.21  As with other spheres of life in mod-
ern society, various legal spheres becomes increasingly rationalized and come 
increasingly at odds with and in conflict with systems of substantive values.  In 
Economy and Society, Weber distinguishes between two types of formal law.  One 
type of formal law is that in which “only unambiguous general characteristics of the 
facts of the case are taken into account” and these can either be facts that are “per-
ceptible as sense data” or facts regarding performances or utterances of symbolic 
acts.  A second type of formal law is law which “definitely fixed legal concepts in 
the form of highly abstract rules are formulated and applied.”22  But he notices that 
there is a sharp contrast between this formal rationality and substantively rational 
law.  In a system guided by substantive rationality: 
 
The decision of legal problems is influenced by norms different from those 
obtained through logical generalization of abstract interpretations of mean-
ing. The norms to which substantive rationality  accords predominance in-
clude ethical imperatives, utilitarian and other expedential rules, and 
political maxims, all of which diverge from the formalism of the ‘external 
characteristics’ variety as well as from that which uses logical abstraction. 
 
International law, throughout the 20th century, has been undergoing a process of 
rationalization which has increasingly distanced the law from the core substantive 
ethical and value foundations of the modern cultural project of human rights.  It is 
important to stress here that I am referring to the most fundamental norms of human 
rights culture, what in legal parlance are referred to as “peremptory norms”, which 
proscribe the most serious violations of ethics.  These peremptory norms include 
such things as genocide, wars of territorial aggrandizement, slavery, genocide, and 
torture, in short, practices which constitute the extreme negative pole of the binary 
system of good and evil in the culture of human rights.  From the standpoint of 
international law, these norms are considered to be non-derogable, that is, there are 
no circumstances in which they are justifiable or allowable.  
 
Yet, in the face of even such strong peremptory norms, these practices remain a 
constant facet of the modern environment.  Just in the last 15 years, genocide has 
occurred in Bosnia, Rwanda, and is presently occurring in Sudan in the face of full 
knowledge about what was happening as it was happening; slavery is endemic in 
the world system with perhaps as many as 27 million people living as slaves;23 one 
out of four nations of the world practice torture in some form as a regular and 
accepted practice, and this practice is evident even in the so-called “civilized” 
 
(1997); Anthony D’Amato, Is International Law Really Law?, 79 NORTHEASTERN L.R. 1293 
(1984/1985).  If international law is not really law, then it must be something else, and this is what opens 
the field completely for sociological considerations of the question: if international law is not law, what 
it is it?  In future work, I will explore international law as performance, rather than power. 
21 See, FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 212. 
22 See, WEBER, supra note 16, at 656-657. 
23 KEVIN BALES, DISPOSABLE PEOPLE: NEW SLAVERY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2000). 
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nations of Europe.24  International law has not been the cause of these events, but to 
a varying extent it has not been able to prevent them and in many cases is indiffer-
ent to them.  This has much to do with the bureaucratic processes which have been 
designed to counter them, as organizations such as the UN follow their own bureau-
cratic procedures and norms.25  The increasing rationalization of international law 
has contributed actively to the carving out of a space in which these practices have 
become, more or less, obdurate social facts of the contemporary world.  
 
In what follows, I offer an empirical example which illustrates the dramatic ten-
sions between international law and human rights in the modern world.  I have 
chosen to use the case of the war in Iraq, since this a defining moment of the early 
21st century and illustrates quite clearly tensions and conflicts between formal and 
substantive rationality, on the one hand, and between different types of substantive 
rationality.  In addition, by way of looking at the war in Iraq, we can also examine 
the conflict between the United States and various segments of what might be 
called “global civil society” united around the idea of peace and formal interna-
tional law.  I want to be very clear that my intention is not to enlist Weber as an ally 
for my own ideological position on the war.26  It is entirely clear that Weber’s 
science does not provide any possibility for the derivation of any kinds of values.  
Rather, a Weberian analysis focuses on pointing out the conflict of value-
orientations, in this case between formal and substantive rationality in the modern 
world.  The analysis here illustrates how the formal mechanisms of international 
law stand in opposition to the value-sphere of human rights.  As I will note later, the 
only possibility that we, as individuals, have is to choose value positions.  As 
Rogers Brubaker notes, quoting Weber: “Torn between conflicting obligation 
deriving from different value spheres, the individual must simply choose: [for 
Weber] ‘according to our ultimate standpoint, the one is the devil and the other 
God, and the individual has to decide which is God for him and which is the 
devil.’”27  If anything, I want to show how a Weberian sociological analysis might 
offer an unusual and powerful new approach to understanding contemporary con-
flicts, even if, ultimately individuals are left to their own devices in choosing 
among mutually irreconcilable value positions.   
II THE CONFLICT OF RATIONALITIES AND THE IRAQ WAR 
The general history of Iraq, its particular history under the rule of Saddam Hussein, 
and the war that was waged against him by an alliance of states, but essentially by 
the United States and Great Britain are complex matters.  In what follows, I would 
like to draw a rough composite of that history, paying specific attention to some of 
the central facts of the case, but also to the specific cultural logics which guided 
24 ANTONIO CASSESE, INHUMAN STATES: IMPRISONMENT, DETENTION, AND TORTURE IN EUROPE 
TODAY (1996). 
25 See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 19. 
26 See CUSHMAN, supra note 1. 
27 ROGERS BRUBAKER, THE LIMITS OF RATIONALITY: AN ESSAY ON THE SOCIAL AND MORAL 
THOUGHT OF MAX WEBER 72 (1984)  
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various individual and collective action in relation to Iraq and its system of power.  
As presented here, this can only be but a rather simplified version of events, yet one 
which is sufficient to illustrate what I mean by the term “the conflict of rationali-
ties.”  My aim here is to offer a framework which moves beyond the rather facile 
ideological issue of whether the war was right or wrong, or dramaturgical discus-
sions about Saddam’s (or for that matter, the “American Empire’s”) “evil”, but 
sees, instead the war itself and the debates about the war as an empirical case which 
illustrates the conflict of rationalities in modernity.28  
 
In 1958, Iraq became a republic after a coup d’etat against the monarchy of King 
Faisal II.   General Abdul Karim Kassem became the leader of the country and 
began a program of reversal of the monarchy’s previous pro-Western policies.  In 
this sense, Iraq was one of many countries in the world-system which sought dra-
matically to break away from Western colonial rule in the post-war period.  And, as 
in many of these post-colonial situations, the country became immersed in extreme 
violence and instability.  The country was characterized by a state of civil war and 
ultimately, in 1968 Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr became the president and brought the 
Baath Party (which had its origins in Syria) to power.  In 1979, Bakr resigned and 
Saddam Hussein became the president of Iraq.  Hussein executed most of his actual 
and potential political rivals, and became a despot who held power through the use 
of systematic fear, torture, and genocide.  In 1980, he waged a war of aggression 
against Iran, which lasted for eight years and in which an estimated 1.5 million 
people were killed.  During his reign, Hussein killed an estimated 300,000 of his 
own subjects. 
 
One of Hussein’s primary obstacles to the total domination of Iraq was the Kurdish 
movement for autonomy.  In 1988, the regime of Saddam Hussein waged the Anfal 
campaign against the Kurds in Northern Iraq, a planned and systematic program of 
mass murder, torture, deportation, and cultural destruction in which chemical 
weapons were used.29  In 1990, he invaded and occupied the independent country of 
Kuwait, declared it to be part of Iraq, systematically killed, tortured, and expelled 
large numbers of the population, and expropriated its substantial wealth for his own 
personal use.  The “world community” (a term which is often used as a synonym 
for the United Nations, which is many things, but not really a community), recog-
nizing that this was a gross violation of international law against aggressive war for 
territorial and material aggrandizement, gave its consent for a multinational force to 
expel Hussein from Kuwait.  The war was won very quickly and this force was 
poised to actually depose Saddam Hussein, but since this was not part of the legal 
mandate, and because of pressure from local Middle Eastern leaders, the forces 
retreated and left Saddam Hussein in power, although severely constrained in terms 
28 For complete histories of Iraq which are relevant to understanding the nature of totalitarianism in Iraq 
and the extent of the violence of Saddam’s regime: see OFRA BENGIO, SADDAM’S WORLD: POLITICAL 
DISCOURSE IN IRAQ (2002); KANAN MAKIYA, REPUBLIC OF FEAR: THE POLITICS OF MODERN IRAQ 
(1998).  
29 For a full report on the Anfal campaign: see Human Rights Watch, Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal 
Campaign Against the Kurds, available at <http://www.hrw.org/wr2k4/3.htm> (last visited Apr. 2, 
2005). 
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of his exercise of power outside of Iraq and his ability to develop weapons of mass 
destruction. 
 
A system of surveillance and constraint was put into place to monitor his actions, 
which instituted international economic sanctions and “no fly zones” within the 
country itself, aimed at curbing the repetition of genocide in the northern and south-
ern Iraq.  But in a formal sense, this system did little to curb his violations of human 
rights. After the Gulf War in 1991 and throughout the 1990s, the Iraqi regime 
engaged in an all-out campaign of devastation against the Ma’dan, or Marsh Arabs, 
Shi’a Muslims who inhabited the marshlands of Southern Iraq.  This campaign was 
characterized by mass executions, widespread imprisonment, torture, and forced 
migrations; Human Rights Watch estimates that from an original population of 
250,000 in 1991, the population of Ma’dan in their ancestral homelands was re-
duced to 40,000 by 2003.30  This certainly constitutes a mass crime against human-
ity, if not, according to standard sociological definitions, a genocidal campaign.  So 
the fact of the matter is that Saddam Hussein perpetrated at least one genocide and 
another campaign which was, at the very least, genocidal. 
 
One of the conditions of the victory over Saddam in the Gulf War of 1991 was that 
Iraq would be subject to weapons inspections.  Increasingly, however, throughout 
the 1990s, the weapons inspection regime deteriorated to the point in 1998 when 
Saddam Hussein halted all cooperation with weapons inspectors and denied them 
access to Iraq. During this period, as well, 16 legal resolutions were passed by the 
United Nations, none of which were complied with by the regime.  Increasingly 
during this time, Saddam Hussein abandoned his secular rhetoric of pan-Arabism 
and replaced it with Islamist religious rhetoric which called for jihad against the 
West.  In addition, the Iraqi regime offered material support for terrorism, espe-
cially to suicide bombers in Israel.  In addition, and entirely within the bound of 
formal international law, Iraq engaged in an “Oil-for-Food” program in which Iraq 
would be allowed to sell oil in exchange for food, thus, in principle, alleviating the 
effects of economic sanctions on the Iraqi people themselves.  Subsequently, it was 
discovered that the intention of this legally sanctioned program was compromised 
by the appropriation of profits by Saddam’s regime, as well as the illegal distribu-
tion of compensation to various people representing their own personal and corpo-
rate interests.  By the end of the 1990s and early 2000s, Saddam Hussein’s regime 
was almost completely outside of the rule of international law, perhaps contained 
by earlier measures, but openly flaunting international law and committing gross 
violations of human rights.  By any measure, and especially by the ethical standards 
of the UN Declaration of Human Rights, his regime was an aberration to the very 
core ideas of the cultural project of human rights.  
 
It was against this backdrop that the United States was attacked in September 2001 
by suicide bombers from the globalized terrorist network known as al-Qaeda.  
30  For a full report on the campaign against the Ma’dan: see Human Rights Watch, The Iraqi Govern-
ment Assault on the Marsh Arabs (2003), available at  
<http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/marsharabs1.htm> (last visited Apr. 22, 2005).  
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While Hussein had held al-Qaeda at a distance, there was a clear homology between 
his own rhetoric and political views and those of al-Qaeda.  In this context, and in 
light of a perceived connection between the ideological and practical aims of al-
Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, in June 2002 the United States declared a new defense 
strategy of  “pre-emptive self-defense”, which declared that the US had the right to 
attack another state if it deemed that state an actual or future threat to US security.  
Within some bodies of international law (but not within the UN Charter), there are 
laws which are concerned with regulating what is called “anticipatory self-defense.”  
According to such laws, there are times when war is in the case of the existence of 
an actual, demonstrable threat.  Yet the Bush doctrine of preemptive war went 
further then this by claiming the right to strike based on conjecture of future threat.  
Following this declaration, the United States began to press the United Nations to 
enforce its own legal resolutions against Iraq and to take action against Saddam 
Hussein, specifically by asking the UN Security Council to vote a resolution to 
constitute a multi-national force to depose Saddam Hussein.  Interestingly enough, 
this was but a subsequent move from an earlier political act, the unanimous passage 
of the Iraq Liberation Act by the US Senate in 1998 and the full support of the 
substance of that act, which included the removal of Saddam from power, by the 
Democrat American president Bill Clinton and the vice-president Al Gore.  
 
It was at this point that fissures in the response to Saddam Hussein’s regime began 
to emerge and solidify in the global world-system.  Several member states of the 
United Nations, including three members of the Security Council (France, China, 
and Russia), demanded more time to bring Saddam Hussein into compliance with 
international legal resolutions.  The United States, however,  based on past failures 
to ensure compliance, questioned the legitimacy of the possibility  of ensuring 
compliance and based on its intelligence reports (which later turned out to be 
faulty), pressed for a resolution to go to war against Iraq and depose Saddam Hus-
sein.  This request was resisted by those nations of the Security Council which had 
the power of veto.  Subsequently, a situation emerged in which traditional allies 
found themselves in conflict, with one party upholding the rule of international law 
and the other arguing that pragmatic considerations and dangers called for decisive 
action.  A coalition of states was formed, led by the United States and Great Britain, 
and war commenced in March of 2003.  This act was, technically speaking, illegal, 
since the Security Council did not authorize it.  As such, it was considered, accord-
ing to the letter of the law, to be a violation of the peremptory norm which pro-
scribes acts of aggressive war.  The war itself, as a conventional war, was quickly 
won by coalition forces, but generated resistance among several sectors of the Iraqi 
population, including former Baathist/Saddam loyalists, and Islamist fundamental-
ists who were not only indigenous to Iraq, but supported by a more general global 
coalition of al Qaeda terrorists. 
 
The persistence of Saddam Hussein’s regime in violation not only of international 
law is a prime example which illustrates the conflict between formal and substan-
tive rationality in modernity.  From the standpoint of the ethical substantive ration-
ality which is at the core of the human rights project, formal international law and 
procedure was substantively irrational. We have not yet discussed the idea of 
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substantive irrationality, but for Weber, this is a very important concept, since it 
encapsulates the disjuncture and conflict between different forms of rationality and 
rationalization processes.  The idea of substantive irrationality simply refers to a 
situation in which formal rationality fails to deliver on the ethics and values of a 
substantive value sphere.  In this case, the substantive irrationality of formal inter-
national law is demonstrated simply by the fact that dominance of formal interna-
tional law within the UN system of global governance stood in direct contradiction 
to the ethics and values of the UN Declaration of Human Rights.  This conflict had 
been evident throughout the entire history of Saddam Hussein’s rule, since formal 
international law did little to curb his excessive violations of substantive ethical 
norms.  As the crisis in the response to Iraq came to a head in the time leading up to 
the war, the dependence on the formal rationality of international law intensified 
and the latter was increasingly distanced from considerations of ethics, or substan-
tive rationality, as a basis for action.  In fact, the case illustrates that, to the extent 
that formal rationality came to dominate as the principle basis for social action, 
substantive ethical considerations retreated farther and farther from the picture.  To 
put it in more stark sociological terms: the more formal procedures and codes 
become “sacralized”, that is held as the highest universal values within a sphere, the 
more ethical substantive rationality becomes “de-sacralized”. 
 
To understand the idea of substantive rationality, let us construct an ideal-typical 
actor who considers himself as oriented toward the value-sphere of the culture of 
human rights.  This individual is aware of the norms and values which constitute 
this sphere, and engages in social action based on his understanding of these norms.  
According to this individual, the most important norms of the human rights culture 
are the peremptory norms which proscribe such things as aggressive wars of territo-
rial aggrandizement, genocide, slavery and torture.  This individual is also commit-
ted to more general values of social and economic rights, which are more positive 
rights which specify what states ought to do for individuals and collectivities rather 
than what states ought not to do.  In other words, this individual is committed to a 
form of substantive rationality – his actions are guided by a cultural system of 
values which are primarily oriented toward helping others achieve freedom, liberty, 
and a decent life.  This individual is aware that all around him there are gross viola-
tions of human rights, and, indeed, that a large number of homo sapiens live with-
out even the basic necessities of life, much less enjoy the right to a dignified 
existence, free of domination and able to pursue their own life-projects. This actor 
exists within a utopian cultural system of values and ethics.  Ideally, he would want 
to see the sacred ideals of the culture of human rights expanded to as many people 
as possible.  He is, however, aware of the obdurate realities of social existence, of 
power, economic and social inequality, that is to say, he has a tragic sense of the 
world.  In spite of the rhetoric of advancement and progress, he sees the persistence 
of human tragedy and recognizes the limitations of the utopian vision by which he 
lives his life. 
 
In the external environment, he is aware of particular states which have existed 
quite a long time and which have institutionalized violations of peremptory norms 
as an essential part of the very fabric of their existence.  Indeed, these states are 
models of the profane, even of evil, by which the substantive positive values of the 
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human rights culture are made all the more sacred and meaningful.  In some ironic 
sociological sense, these states are necessary as a reference point for defining the 
meaning of what is just and unjust, what is good and evil.  This individual values 
the idea of the rule of law and understands that the origins of international law lay 
precisely in the effort to regulate the “wicked” conduct of nations, to avert war if 
possible, and, in the event of war to regulate or “civilize” the conduct of war.  
Guided by these values, this individual needs to make meaning of the situation of 
Iraq and what should be done in relation to it.  As with other “civilized” persons, he 
looks to international law as a means by which to translate his substantive values 
into practice.  Yet, when he encounters the law, he encounters a set of bureaucratic 
procedures and legal codes which, it seems, as guides to practical action, have 
worked more to appease and even  intensify gross violations of human rights.  For 
this individual, international law appears to be substantively irrational, seemingly 
aiding and abetting the very violations of sacred principles which are central 
frameworks of meaning which guide his social action in the world.  The condition 
of contradiction yields a certain sense of despair, since the only alternative means 
for reconciling the contradiction and making substantive values once again para-
mount, are themselves at odds with his fundamental value system.  In this case, it is 
clear that war against Saddam Hussein will be an act of “tyrannicide” and will open 
the avenues for the Iraqi people to reclaim their popular sovereignty and establish 
their status as members of the “community of rights” and live according to the 
“Law of Peoples.”31  Our individual is in despair, trapped between the Scylla of 
formal rationality and the Charibdis of the evil of war.  The choice of which to yield 
to is a choice between evils, but nonetheless, in a Weberian sense, a choice which 
has to be made in consideration of an ethics of conviction. 
 
This hermeneutic experiment simply illustrates how the conflict of formal and 
substantive rationality might be experienced at the level of subjectivity.  What 
needs to be explained is why international law became, in a sense, sacralized in 
opposition to considerations of the sacral principles of human rights.  It is not 
sufficient simply to posit that a disjuncture emerged, but to offer some explanation 
as to why.  For Weber, the process of rationalization – whether formal rationaliza-
tion or substantive rationalization – needs to be seen in relation to specific constel-
lations of interests and historical events which drive the process.  I offer here a brief 
consideration of some of the factors which lead to the “triumph of formal rational-
ity” in the sphere of international law. 
 
31 ALAN GEWIRTH, THE COMMUNITY OF RIGHTS (1996); Gewirth claims that it is not possible for actors 
to consider themselves part of a “community of rights” (or what I have been referring to as the cultural 
project of human rights) while systematically and intentionally excluding others from that community.  
In this sense, international law as a practice has excluded large numbers of people from the community 
of rights. In addition, John Rawls, as a neo-Kantian, held that the Society of Peoples would consist of 
republics of free citizens, not of outlaw states such as Iraq, North Korea, Iran, etc.  In each case, law and 
formal organization stand outside of the core of substantive values; See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF 
PEOPLES (1999). 
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As Koskenniemi has shown,32 the operation of international law in the post-World 
War II era was severely constrained by the realities of the Cold War.  The guiding 
logic of that era was realpolitik - states would behave almost purely on pragmatic 
considerations of their interests and the two dominant states, the United States and 
the Soviet Union did precisely this.  As a result, international law, to the extent that 
it had any power at all, was reduced to an ideal to which all parties were aware 
could only yield to raw power and interest.  This power did not have the effect of 
displacing international law as a system of procedures and formal codes, but it did 
render them increasingly “performative”, in the sense that something could be 
declared legal or illegal, but with little or no result given the fact that the law had no 
actual power to back it up.  Thus, increasingly, international law became a perfor-
mative practice.  Law was something that could be done (in the sense of performed) 
in light of the fact that nothing could be done.  
 
 International law became a formal means which powerless states could at least 
claim some presence in the global arena, even if such presence conferred no real 
power and had little effect on specific political outcomes.  It allowed for the option 
of at least displaying some form of counter-hegemony against the realities of 
power, even if only at the symbolic level.  Such displays of counter-hegemony were 
intensified to the extent that more and more nations participated in them.  In the 
years after World War II, as a result of decolonization, more and more nations 
became members of the United Nations and, thus brought into the arena of the 
world community and international law.  With this increasing number of nations, 
specific alliances and blocs emerged in which less powerful nations could pursue 
their own self-interests and collective interests.  International law became, for such 
alliances and blocs, something which could be instrumentally used to exert some 
kind of presence on the world arena, and in some cases actual power.  More impor-
tantly, in becoming strictly a means toward the end of establishing presence, power, 
and the pursuit of self-interest, international law increasingly became divorced from 
any system of substantive ethics, since participation in the system of law had noth-
ing to do with the adherence to the substantive norms of human rights.  A larger 
number of new member states of the United Nations after the period of decoloniza-
tion were what John Rawls referred to as “outlaw” states.  That is, they were coun-
tries in which gross violations of peremptory norms of human rights were the rule 
rather than the exception.  Nonetheless, membership in the United Nations had 
nothing whatsoever to do with substantive rationality, or perhaps more aptly put, 
the substance of sovereignty.  The only criterion for membership was to meet the 
formal criterion of state sovereignty and to be recognized as sovereign by other 
nation-states. Outlaw states came to be full participants in the system of interna-
tional law and, more importantly, were enabled in the formation of alliances and 
blocs against hegemonic powers in which the formal rationality of international law 
became the primary source of power. 
 
A clear case of this process can be found in the election of Libya in 2003 to be the 
head of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the central organiza-
                                                          
32 See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 5. 
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tional body of the UN which was founded to address gross-violations of human 
rights in the world.  That event was made possible by the alliance of groups of weak 
states, especially in Africa, which voted for Libya – one of the most egregious 
violators of human rights in the world-system – to head the commission, while 
simultaneously expelling the United States from the commission (even though it 
had been founded by Eleanor Roosevelt and the US had been represented since the 
commission’s foundation).33  Here we see a perfect example of the manipulation of 
formal procedures and rule to the advantage of outlaw states, and, again a disjunc-
ture between formal rationality and substantive rationality. Indeed, the election of 
Libya to head the commission was an example of the substantive irrationality of 
formal international law and procedure. 
 
The enduring influence of realpolitik was a force which distantiated formal ration-
ality from substantive rationality.  Another factor in this distantiation is what might 
be called the social control uncertainty.  At the most basic sociological level, law is 
a social form which aims at controlling uncertainty.  The post-war period and the 
emergence of the Cold War was a period of increasing uncertainty, especially with 
the development of weapons of mass destruction.  This was not only an uncertainty 
about the capricious use of force and the possibility of “mutually assured destruc-
tion” through the development of nuclear arms, but the more generalized uncer-
tainty characteristic of the “risk society”.34  In relation to the exercise of power, 
international law had always been grounded in a concern for checking the uncer-
tainties and caprices of power.  In a condition of heightened uncertainty, interna-
tional law became an even more important means for dealing with uncertainty.  
Under the regime of international law, human rights violators such as Saddam 
Hussein could be checked and contained, but the logic which guides containment 
has little to do with any consideration of substantive values or ethics. Rather, the 
logic of containment is purely one of reducing uncertainty through the instrumental 
means of international law.  International law increasingly became tied to a practi-
cal logic of containment which assured a certain stability and order, but tolerated 
gross violations of human rights.  As such, formal international law aimed at con-
tainment is substantively irrational from the point of view of the values of human 
rights culture.   
 
One of the principal arguments against the Iraq war is that it would lead to chaos at 
a number of levels in the world-system.  So the argument went, in the  Middle East, 
it would upset the containment of the passions and problems in that area and actu-
ally exacerbate the problem of terrorism by creating more ressentiment and lead to 
the expansion of the ranks of terrorists.  At the global level, the unilateral action of 
powerful states against international law, especially if grounded in substantive 
rationality of humanitarianism, freedom, and liberation, would send the signal to 
other powerful states that they, too, could act outside of international law.  This 
would produce a global situation of capricious use of power, “bogus” humanitarian 
33 To give a quantitative sense of the strength of this vote: on the committee, 33 members voted for 
Libya, 3 against, and 17 abstained, in this case, abstention being essentially a deferral to the majority.  
34 ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY (1992). 
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wars, and intensify the condition of generalized uncertainty.  Such a view served to 
strengthen the movement toward the formal rationality of international law, even if, 
as I noted above, this adherence to the law was not an actual form of power, but a 
kind of performative ritual. In this sense, following in the classical traditions of 
sociological and anthropological thought on ritual, we might posit that the more 
actors perceive a situation of risk and uncertainty, the more they are driven to ritual 
forms which provide certainty and order.  In this case, the war in Iraq opened up a 
Pandora’s Box of uncertainties which enhanced the attractiveness of the formal 
rationality of international law, if not as a real form of power, at least as a perform-
ance of certainty and order. 
 
A final explanation lies in a consideration of the rise of a class of legal experts in 
the post-war world-system.  As we noted earlier, international law in the 19th cen-
tury was a creation of a new class of legal experts.  The development of interna-
tional law occurred concurrently with the rise of the profession of the international 
lawyer.35  This new professional class, and the law it attempted to create was not, 
however, disinterested.  By its very aim of attempting to regulate the conduct of 
states, the laws of war, and other forms of power, international law and the interna-
tional legal system set itself up as an autonomous system of power and the elites 
who comprised it a new class of political elites.  While quite literally extirpated by 
the events of the first half of the twentieth century, international law and a new 
class of international legal experts emerged like a phoenix from the ashes of World 
War II.  This new class of experts has only intensified since the war, joined by a 
whole new class of global activists from non-governmental organizations who, as a 
bloc, represent a formidable source of power against sovereign states.  The cultural 
capital of this new class is international law and it is extremely important to under-
stand the power, interests, and culture of this new class as a force which has intensi-
fied the formal rationality of international law.  This is a class characterized by its 
own cultural norms and what Alvin Gouldner referred to as a “culture of critical 
discourse.”36  Even if we disregard the attraction of weak states to international law 
as a form of empowerment, or the strengthening of international law as a response 
to uncertainty, we must also consider that this new system of elites, which consists 
primarily of legal experts, has a vested interest in maintaining its own autonomy 
and power, as a class-for-itself in Marx’s terms, in the world system.  If the system 
of international law is threatened by powerful states or unilateral decisions to go to 
war, then so too is the class of experts for whom international law is the basis of its 
power.  
 
What I have outlined above are three possible explanations for intensification of the 
rationalization of international law.  In this case, one can even speak of a “sacraliza-
tion” of international law, since expressions of law were not only instrumental and 
rational, but performances of the sacred ideals of order, stability, and empowerment 
of the weak.  This is a topic which needs further development, since it is clear that 
Weber’s perspective on rationality seemed to pit formal rationality and instrumental 
35 See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 5. 
36 ALAN GOULDNER, THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUALS AND THE RISE OF THE NEW CLASS (1982). 
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reason against substantive value-spheres, each of which had its own pattern of 
values, ethics, and a sense of the sacred. 
 
These explanations are by no means exhaustive, but indicate that the rationalization 
of international law is driven, at least, by concrete historical events, the interests of 
states, and the interests of new classes of experts and activists.  In any case, from 
the strict standpoint of the substantive cultural project of human rights, it is this 
rationalization process which is the source of substantive irrationality. In what 
follows, I turn to examine another form of the conflict of rationalities: the conflict 
of substantive rationalities. 
 
III THE CONFLICT OF SUBSTANTIVE RATIONALITIES                            
IN GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 
The Iraq war was not only unpopular to a large number of states in the world sys-
tem.  The war was also extremely unpopular at the grassroots level of what might 
be called global civil society.  Well before the war began, large-scale demonstra-
tions against the war occurred all over the world, especially in European and 
American cities.  These demonstrations were usually referred to as “peace demon-
strations”, an important nomenclature because it indicates that, as collective actions, 
these events were, sociologically speaking, expressions of a substantive rationality 
which defined peace as an ultimate value and, conversely, war and American he-
gemony/power as an evil.  As empirical manifestations, these forms of collective 
behavior indicate the existence within the more general society of what might be 
called “peace culture” (or, alternatively, “anti-war culture”).  It is tempting to as-
sume that peace culture is synonymous with human rights culture, but as I shall 
soon discuss, this is not necessarily the case. 
 
 In almost no case - even though many if not most of the demonstrators probably 
would have considered themselves to be part of the global culture of human rights - 
did any of the demonstrations refer to the gross violations of human rights, or the 
suffering of the Iraqi people under Saddam Hussein’s regime.  This suffering had 
been rather well-documented, and more importantly, most of the Iraqi population 
had expressed the public opinion that they desired intervention as a means of libera-
tion from Saddam’s regime.37  The human rights violations of Saddam Hussein and 
the suffering of the Iraqi people were not a central part of what I would call the 
structure of attention of global civil society toward the war.  Indeed, in stark con-
trast, these collective displays were primarily symbolic attacks against the United 
States, collective spectacles in which the United States, in general, and the Ameri-
can president were quite literally, to use Jeffrey Alexander’s expression “engorged” 
with evil.38  The American president, for his part, had already engaged in this same 
kind of symbolic project by presenting a social construction of evil in which he 
37 See CUSHMAN, supra note 1. 
38 JEFFREY ALEXANDER, THE MEANINGS OF SOCIAL LIFE: A CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY (2003). 
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referred to Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as “the Axis of Evil.”  These nations became 
the principal “receptacles” of evil, and when “filled”, were appropriate targets for 
preemptive military action.  The United States, for opponents of the war, was a 
principal receptacle of evil, and when “filled”, became an appropriate target for 
collective social action against it by either individuals, collectivities, or states. 
 
I make this point to illustrate that much of the conflict about the war took place at 
this symbolic level of meaning-making within two differing substantive value 
orientations.  As such, what I have referred to as the conflict of rationalities was not 
limited to the conflict between the formal rationality of international law and the 
substantive rationality of either human rights or the substantive rationality of the 
American values and ideologies, but between different forms of substantive ration-
ality.  What is most interesting from a sociological point of view is that there was 
virtually no mobilization of global civil society on behalf of the Iraqi people, who, 
at least according to the usually expressed values of the cultural project of human 
rights, would have been (and actually were, prior to the war) the direct subject of 
attention on the part of human rights activists.  For instance, the organization Hu-
man Rights Watch, one of the largest non-governmental organizations within the 
human rights culture, had devoted decades to providing detailed analyses of human 
rights violations in Iraq.  Human Rights Watch had always maintained certain 
political neutrality in political affairs, so as to enhance its reputation and status as 
an “equal opportunity” exposer of human rights violations.  But in this case, in 
contrast to its usual position of neutrality, it actually took a position against the war 
as a humanitarian effort, based on its view that the motives of the war were not 
humanitarian, and ignoring any consideration of the consequences for the Iraqi 
people.39
 
Here, a crucial sociological question emerges: why was it the case that the structure 
of attention to the war followed along the lines of a substantive rationality which 
focused on the value of peace, the evil of war, and the danger/evil of the United 
States, rather than a substantive rationality which valued solidarity with the Iraqis 
and the evil of fascism and totalitarianism?  It is possible to imagine a scenario in 
which the Iraqi people appealed to Western global civil society and that crucial 
sectors of that civil society could be mobilized to support their efforts to be liber-
ated.  This was, in a sense, the model of the Spanish Civil War, in which most 
members of the liberal community outside of Spain supported the resistance to 
Franco.  And it is clearly the case, as Jeffrey Alexander has argued, that the civil 
rights movement in the United States was catalyzed by the mobilization of Northern 
elites to the cause of redressing injustice in the South.  In this case, the community 
of liberals in the West who mobilized in support of the war, not on the grounds in 
which George Bush attempted to legitimate it, but on the grounds of some funda-
mental commitment to anti-fascism, freedom, liberation, and solidarity with the 
39 I have provided an extended critique of HRW’s position, as well as an argument which considers 
solidarity with the Iraqi people and the positive consequences of the war for human rights in Iraq; See 
CUSHMAN, supra note 1.  
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Iraqi people was decidedly small, so small, in fact, that it constituted a tiny majority 
of the worldwide liberal community. 
 
Why was this the case?  The sociological answer to this question has to move 
beyond some facile explanation that many people in the global civil society found 
George Bush to be extremely distasteful.40  I would suggest some preliminary 
answers here.  Perhaps the simplest explanation is that, for the most part, global 
civil society, as a “society of liberals” has come to define the absence of war as a 
higher value than the protection and rescue of those whose human rights are being 
devalued.  That is to say, while the values of human rights remain accessible and 
viable as keys which might be played in a performance of liberal identity, they 
remain primarily performative values available for the “public display of the right 
attitude.”  Who among liberals, for instance, is against human rights?  The culture 
of human rights is always available for the performance of liberal identity.  As 
performances, in J.L. Austin’s sense, one can say one is for human rights and as-
sume by so saying that one has done something.41  But from a practical point of 
view, saying something may not have anything to do with doing something and, in 
some cases, may become a stand-in for doing something.  Performances are them-
selves structured and conditioned by the social contours in which they exist: in-
creasing social differentiation and social distantiation from others characteristic of 
modernity means that saying something may be the only option for actors who want 
to “make a difference” but cannot.  In addition, such performative declarations of 
being “for” human rights, might be as much about creating an identity for the self as 
it is in any meaningful way a means of doing something for the Other. 
 
There are powerful historical reasons why peace and stability have become the 
cornerstones of the substantive rationality of global civil society.  In the European 
case, there is a certain war-weariness, well-grounded in the historical experiences of 
war in 20th century Europe.42  In the American case, the Iraq war was reminiscent of 
the Vietnam war, which had become well-sacralized as an evil historical event on 
the American left, and even among the more general population.  As such, any 
possibility of war was bound to be symbolically circumscribed by the collective 
memory of the evil of war, which itself has become a crucial aspect of not only 
realpolitik ideologies of containment, but of the very meaning system of the culture 
of global civil society. 
 
Another reason has to do with what might be called the “ideological mismanage-
ment” of the war by American political elites.  It would be foolish to address the 
question I raised above purely by resorting to extraneous explanatory factors.  In its 
40 I would add here one ethnographic  observation relevant to the  interpretation of the war in Iraq: one of 
the primary hurdles to sociological understanding of the war and the response to it has been, when it is 
raised  as a subject of intellectual and scholarly study, there is almost always a hasty retreat on the part of 
intellectuals and scholars who opposed the war into a  reactionary, reductionistic  and ideological morass 
which is distinctly anti-sociological, if not more generally anti-intellectual.  This is a subject that de-
serves far more consideration than I can offer here.   
41 J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (1962). 
42 OMER BARTOV, MIRRORS OF DESTRUCTION: WAR, GENOCIDE, AND MODERN IDENTITY (2000). 
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initial incarnation, the legitimacy of the war was grounded almost exclusively in the 
practical rhetoric of self-defense: Saddam Hussein had violated all of the resolu-
tions which were made to enhance security, and intelligence showed that he was a 
threat.  Of course, this turned out to be a claim that was not substantiated, at least to 
the degree to which the US had made it.  At best, what could be proved was that 
Saddam Hussein had more or less disarmed according to the terms of the initial 
resolutions, but that he had left an infrastructure in place that, with the financial aid 
from the Oil-for-Food program, the degeneration of the inspection process, and the 
bureaucratic torpor and indifference of the UN could be reconstituted. 
 
As it became clear that the central justification for the war – weapons of mass 
destruction were not present in appreciable quantities – the American political elite 
slowly and gradually began to deploy the rhetoric of liberation, freedom, democ-
racy, and human rights.  Since the credibility of the more pragmatic rationale for 
war had been comprised, so too were any subsequent rationales for the war, even 
those that would have normatively resonated with liberal members of the human 
rights culture.  This was the case even though this rhetoric actually resonated with 
the desires of the Iraqi people for such liberation, freedom, or human rights (and 
almost all survey research subsequent to the war shows these values to be strongly 
evident among the Iraqi population).43  The response to this shift in rhetoric was one 
of decided cynicism or what Peter Sloterdijk has referred to as “cynical reason.”44  
Cynical reason perhaps might be another form of rationality in modernity, one 
which Weber may have been trying to capture in his metaphors of disenchantment 
(but which his friend Georg Simmel really did capture in just a few short passages 
from The Philosophy of Money).45  Cynical rationality seems to be distinct from 
either formal or substantive rationality: it does not emphasize form or substance, 
but independently calls for the discreditation and devaluation of both form and 
substance.46  This type of reason subjects any and all statements, especially by  
political elites, to the hermeneutics of suspicion, with the result that even the most 
resonant of moral rationales, especially if contaminated by other factors, is doubted 
and discounted as a source of legitimation.  Since most of the criticism of the war 
came from the global left, it is reasonable to surmise that some of the diagnoses of 
the cultural crises of the left by such thinkers as Richard Rorty or Todd Gitlin 
concerning the lack of commitment to global values and common dreams is also 
evident at a more global level.47  Further explorations of this issue might be ex-
plored as part of what might be called “sociology of indifference”, indifference 
43 See CUSHMAN, supra note 1. 
44 PETER SLOTERDIJK, CRITIQUE OF CYNICAL REASON (1987). 
45 GEORG SIMMEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MONEY (1990).  
46 This line of thought is suggested in several important works which define cynicism as a central aspect 
of modernity; See, e.g., JEFFREY C. GOLDFARB, THE CYNICAL SOCIETY: THE CULTURE OF POLITICS AND 
THE POLITICS OF CULTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1991); RICHARD STIVERS, THE CULTURE OF CYNICISM: 
AMERICAN MORALITY IN DECLINE (1994); TIMOTHY BLEWES, CYNICISM AND POSTMODERNITY (VERSO, 
1997).  
47 RICHARD RORTY, ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY: LEFTIST THOUGHT IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 
(1998).  
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being, in my opinion, one of the crucial understudied phenomena in the 20th cen-
tury.48
 
As with our discussion of formal rationality above, these explanations of the domi-
nance of the substantive rationality of what might be called “peace culture” or 
“anti-war culture” within global civil society by no means are exhaustive.  What is 
called for is a more general sociological account of this form of substantive ration-
ality as a central constitutive value-orientation of global civil society and, more 
importantly, how it is that “peace culture” and “human rights culture” might actu-
ally be in conflict rather than part of the same cultural project of global civil soci-
ety. 
 
This statement might be puzzling to those who consider that a commitment to peace 
and a commitment to human rights and social justice are not as incompatible as I 
have made them out to be.  The last few years have witnessed the rise of move-
ments which characterize their aims as the establishment of “Peace and Justice”.  
Indeed, such movements have even spilled over into academic curricula in the form 
of “peace and justice” programs of academic study.  In a general sense, these terms 
are considered intuitively to be coterminous.  Yet, as social phenomena, peace and 
justice may not necessarily be related at all, and in fact, may be in opposition in 
many cases.  For example, Emperor Hirohito was almost certainly guilty of war 
crimes during World War II, but in the interests of peace and stability was allowed 
to remain as emperor.  The absence of war in Iraq would surely constitute a state of 
peace, although it would maintain a totalitarian system of violence and an unjust 
society in Iraq.  As Kalberg notes, “Substantively rational points of view may differ 
within a single sphere.”49  I would argue that this is the case within the value-sphere 
of global civil society, even if “peace culture” is more strongly dominant at the 
present time.  And it is the case that the substantive rationality of “peace culture” is 
much more “rational” from the standpoint of the formal system of international law, 
since international law formally aims to establish stability and regulate war.  Inter-
national law and peace culture form a “coalition in a triad”,50 where the third party 
which argues for wars grounded in the value of the advancement of human rights is 
seen as extremely substantively irrational.  This coalition also views new American 
values and ideologies of salvation and the new “American messianism” as substan-
tively irrational.  Yet from the standpoint of the third party, the formal rationality of 
international law is substantively irrational and the substantive rationality of peace 
culture is irrational because it ignores gross violations of human rights and aligns 
itself with a system of formal law which is, in Weber’s terms, an “abomination to 
all systems of fraternal ethics.”  
 
48 See SIMMEL, supra note 46.  The basis for such sociology was laid out very clearly in Georg Simmel’s 
discussion of cynicism and the blasé attitude. 
 
49 See KALBERG, supra note 12. 
50 THEODORE CAPLOW, TWO AGAINST ONE: COALITION I TRIADS (1968). 
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 Following Weber it is important to stress that the radical perspectivalism of any 
discussion of conflicting rationalities.51  What is rational from one point, is irra-
tional from the other standpoint and vice versa.  As Kalberg notes, “Life-spheres… 
defend their own value postulates as ‘rational’ and label those of other life-spheres 
as ‘irrational’.”52  There is no possibility that a proper form of rationality can be 
derived from sociology.  All positions are equally valid on their own terms, and it is 
impossible to prove which one of them is “right” in any ethical sense, so we find 
ourselves, as Weber, not only recognizing the obdurate reality of rationalities in 
relation to one another and in concordance and conflict with one another, but we 
also find ourselves locked within that reality, that is, the end result of our analysis 
produces a certain sense of despair. 
 
IV THE CONTEMPORARY CONDITION OF LIBERAL DESPAIR  
In this essay, I have tried to illustrate, using the case of the Iraq war, that the con-
flict of rationalities that Weber first outlined in his own work persists into the 21st 
century.  I have argued that the formal rationality of international law is increas-
ingly at odds with the substantive rationality of the cultural project of human rights.  
In addition, I have argued that within the larger culture of global civil society, there 
also exists a conflict of substantive rationalities.  The major fault line of this con-
flict lies in the struggle between peace culture/anti-war culture, on the one hand, 
and human rights culture, on the other.  I have suggested some preliminary explana-
tions for the process of the formal rationalization of the law, as well as the substan-
tive rationalization of global civil society and have suggested that Max Weber’s 
theories of rationalization processes and types of rationality remain valuable con-
ceptual and heuristic devices for understanding contemporary social, political, and 
cultural conflicts. 
 
Yet, what is the use of translating a set of empirical particulars about a present-day 
conflict into a theoretical schema which merely conceptualizes these conflicts?  Of 
what use is such knowledge, especially if it only converts actually existing histori-
cal fault lines into theoretical ones?  The scenario I have presented seems explicitly 
pessimistic in Weber’s own sense that in understanding the conflict of rationalities 
we have not in any way laid out a path of escape from or reconciliation of this 
conflict.  David Trubek has described Weber’s philosophy of history, derived from 
his sociological analysis of modernity, as a form of  “tragic modernism”.53  Jeffrey 
Alexander has described Weber as a “liberal in despair.”54  There is plenty of evi-
dence that the conflict of rationalities has led to the emergence of despair, or per-
haps disenchantment within global civil society.  International lawyers despair over 
the ineffectuality of their formal international law in the face of American hegem-
51 See also KALBERG, supra note 12. 
52 Id. 
53 See TRUBEK, supra note 4. 
54 JEFFREY ALEXANDER, THEORETICAL LOGIC IN  SOCIOLOGY: VOLUME 3, THE CLASSICAL ATTEMPT AT 
THEORETICAL SYNTHESIS: MAX WEBER (1983). 
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ony.  Peace activists despair over the war in Iraq and the idea that war might be an 
appropriate means for overthrowing tyranny and establishing a regime of human 
rights.  Human rights activists despair over the persistence of human rights viola-
tions in the world and the obdurate persistence of phenomena which violate the 
very ethical core of their value-sphere and they despair when international law 
becomes a mechanism of domination rather than liberation.  Indeed, it might be 
appropriate now to engage in the ethnography of despair, in order to capture the 
elementary forms of disenchantment and despair that are a product of the conflict of 
rationalities.55
 
In Weber’s philosophy, all talk of reform seems senseless, since there can be no 
agreement or concordance among the various forms of rationality.  Almost surely, 
Weber would see the United Nations and international law as “an iron cage”, per-
haps even a form of bureaucratic despotism.  As Langenbacher has noted, “[for 
Weber], bureaucratic despotism will have an all-powerful, insulated plutocratic 
ruling class, differing from previous despotisms by being substantially more resil-
ient and ineradicable.”56  Yet Weber, the theorist of power, would also see the perils 
and pitfalls of an unrestrained use of military power and the doctrine of pre-emptive 
war.  And he would most likely see attempts at building global cultures of value as 
the basis for international relations and the relationships among human beings as 
being not only utopian, but impossible in the face of the mutual irreconcilability 
between formal and substantive rationality, on the one hand, and various substan-
tive rationalities on the other.  In the face of these realities, despair borne of socio-
logical understanding seems to lead only to indifference and inertia.  Is this the 
future? 
 
As I mentioned earlier, Weber informed us that, ultimately each individual has to 
choose which type of rationality is God and which is the devil.  There may be no 
possibility of reconciliation of the rationalities.  Perhaps the only possibility might 
be for a dialogue among the rationalities, yet such a dialogue is itself limited by the 
fact that rationalities are the very source of meaning and action in the world, and as 
such mutually impenetrable.  Weber’s own involvement in politics and his specifi-
cation that in light of the conflict of rationalities we must choose our own ethnic of 
conviction might be the best we can do.  In some senses, Weber anticipated the 
postmodern view that, in the failure of grand narratives and the triumph of instru-
mental reason, freedom consists in the development of a virtual infinity of “life-
projects” in which individuals decide on their own courses of action based on their 
own derivations of what is meaningful to them.  Whether such life projects can co-
exist in plurality or lead to new forms of individual and collective conflict remains 
to be seen. 
 
55 Along those lines, I would suggest beginning with that category of liberals who have despaired at the 
re-election of George Bush and are said to be suffering from “Post-Election Selection Trauma” (PEST), 
a category of mental illness recently specified by the American Health Association.  
56 Eric Langenbacher, Disenchanted Liberals: Alexis De Toqueville and Max Weber, 1 INTERNATIONAL 
J. P. E. 27 (2001). 
